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Legal Consequences of the Third Degree
Webster's New International Dictionary defines "third degree"
as, "severe examination or treatment of a prisoner commonly by
continuous questioning over excessively long periods but at times
by starving or physical torture by the police to extort an admission
or confession." In common parlance, however, the term is limited
to violence or other methods designed to cause physical suffering.
Due to this misconception, the practice of the third degree is often
vigorously denied where the accused is "grilled" continuously for
hours without sleep or food. In police and criminal procedure and
practice it is said that the "first degree" is practiced when the ar-
rest is made; the "second degree" when the accused is confined;
and the "third degree" when the accused is questioned in private
quarters.2
A recent case indicates with startling clarity that brutality is
still commonly practiced by our police and penitentiary officials.-
In this case an inmate of the Illinois State Farm sued the super-
intendent as representative of the state for damages under the
Civil Rights Act.- He alleged that he was struck over the head
with a black-jack, resulting in an infection of the middle ear, kept
in solitary confinement for 92 days, fed bread and water six days
a week with one full meal every seventh day, for 92 days, and
that he wa: compelled to sleep on a wet blanket. The court held
that this stated a cause of action against the superintendent be-
cause of the failure of the superintendent to exercise care for plain-
tiff's well-being.
The third degree is a secret practice and one which is illegal,
therefore, it is safe to assume that the number of cases referred
to in judicial opinions is but a small fraction of the total number.
The number that have been brought to light display such brutality
and form such a pattern that there can be no doubt that the use
of such methods is prevalent, if not wide spread.
What protection is there to a man who must submit to the in-
dignities of the third degree?
RESTRICTIONS ON CONFESSIONS AS EVIDENCE
Because of the widespread use of the third degree, confessions
are carefully scrutinized by the courts and will not be accepted in
1 2d ed. 1938.
2Address by Major Sylvester, before the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, 1910. 3 WIGMORE EVIDENCE §851 (3d ed. 1940).
3 Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
417 STAT. 13, 8 U.S.C. §§43, 47, 48 (1940).
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evidence if there is slight proof that they were not voluntarily
made.5 A statement from a Massachusetts case is indicative of this
attitude:
This (confession), however, is a very doubtful species
of evidence, and is to be admitted with great caution.
Hasty confessions may be easily extorted by threats or
promises from a person accused of crime, when in a state
of agitation and alarm; and therefore all such confessions
are excluded from the consideration of the jury. The slight-
est influence . . . is sufficient to exclude them.6
In the famous case aptly named the "Sweat Box Case", the
accused was convicted of burglary. Without his confession there
was not sufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty. The
defendant was incarcerated in a compartment 5 x 8 feet in size
which was kept entirely dark. The court summarized the method
employed by the state:
For fear that some stray ray of light or breath of air
might enter without special invitation, the small cracks
were carefully blanketed. The prisoner was allowed no
communication whatever with human beings. Occasion-
ally the officer who had put him there, would appear, and
interrogate him about the crime charged against him. To
the credit of our advanced civilization and humanity it
must be said that neither the thumbscrew nor the wooden
boot was used to extort a confession. The efficacy of the
sweat box was the sole reliance. This, with the hot weather
of summer, and the fact that the prisoner was not provided
with sole-leather lungs, finally after 'several days' of ob-
stinate denial, accomplished the purpose of eliciting a 'free
and voluntary' confession.8
After a severe castigation of the chief of police who submitted the
defendant to these indignities, the court held that the confession
was incompetent evidence.
Before the days of such refinements as the electric chair, the
gas chamber, the rubber hose, and the rolled telephone directory
that leave no tell-tale marks, a common method of obtaining a
"voluntary confession" was to hang the accused by the neck. Such
treatment renders a resulting confession involuntary9
A confession obtained by striking, whipping or beating is ordi-
narily held to be involuntary and inadmissible as evidence.10 The
5It should be remembered, however, that confessions are presumed
to be voluntary and the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show
they were not. State v. Grover, 96 Me. 363, 368, 52 Atl. 757, 759 (1902);
Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F. 2d 805, 809 (C.C.A. 9th 1937).
6 Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 495, 505 (Mass. 1830).
7 Ammons v. Mississippi, 80 Miss. 592 (1902).
8 Id. at 594.
9 Strady v. State, 5 Cold. 300 (Tenn. 1868).
1 0 Williams v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. Rep. 87, 225 S.W. 177 (1920); See
People v. Tipscireska, 212 Mich. 484, 180 N.W. 617 (1920)..
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conduct of police officers in needlessly laying hands on a helpless
man deserves the severest censure.".
The "water cure", consisting of pouring water into the nose of
the accused so as to strangle him has also been used to force a con-
fession and also renders the confession inadmissible.'2
There are other means of employing the third degree not asso-
ciated with direct acts of physical violence. Questioning may be
coercive if it is excessive in length, or is accompanied by, or con-
sists of, threats, or if it injects fear into the mind of the prisoner.
The illegality of the arrest or custody will not of itself render a
confession involuntary. 13 It has also been held that even if the
accused's hands and feet were tied when the confession was made,
this would not of itself render the statement inadmissible.14 The
same conclusion is reached when the accused confesses while hand-
cuffed 15 or while tied with a rope if the tying is not painful and the
confession is not made to procure relief. 6
The attitude of Ohio courts on the third degree may not be so
liberal, but is realistic in recognizing that the use of the third de-
gree is the cause of as many unjustified acquittals as improper con-
victions. Usually, Ohio courts have admitted the confessions be-
cause, "We have not come to the place in our criminal jurisprudence
that whenever the issue is the admission of a purported confession
secured by police officers, while the prisoner is in their custody,
their testimony on the subject is therefore to be disbelieved."' 7
11People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18, 113 N.E. 538 (1916); Missouri v.
Ellis, 294 Mo. 270, 242 S.W. 952 (1922).
13 White v. State, 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903 (1922).
13 Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484, 499 (1880); Gilmore v. State, 3 Okla.
Crim. 434, 106 Pac. 801 (1910); State v. Raftery, 252 Mo. 72, 80, 158 S.W.
585 (1913).
"' Franklin v. State, 28 Ala. 9 (1856).
15 State v. Whitfield, 109 N.C. 876, 13 S.E. 726 (1891).
16 State v. Cruse, 74 N.C. 393 (1876). For additional interesting cases
giving police officials broad latitude in obtaining confessions see Coates,
Limitations on Investigating Officers, 15 N.C.L. Rv. 229, 233 (1936-37).
'1 State v. Collett, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 225, 58 N.E. 2d 417, 425 (1944); State
v. Arnold, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 63 N.E. 2d 31 (1945). Cf. Spears v. State, 2
Ohio St. 583 (1853). Compare the Federal view as set forth in Ashcraft
et al v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944), where Mr. Justice Black says,
"It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our
courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays
to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-examination for thirty-
six hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a 'voluntary' confes-
sion. Nor can we consistently with Constitutional due process of law,
hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same thing away
from the restraining influences of a public trial in an open court room."
Haley v. State, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1948); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237
(1940); Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). But see Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
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Similarly, in a recent Ohio case three minors suspected of
murder were apprehended and before they were taken before any
court and before charges were filed against them, signed confessions
were obtained. The defendants claimed these confessions were
obtained by duress and third degree methods and therefore were
inadmissible. The court summarily rejected this argument saying,
"This question ... was submitted to the jury, which found against
the accused. We are in accord with these findings."18 On writ of
certiorari the United States Supreme Court stated that the undis-
puted testimony showed that Haley, a 15 year old boy, was ques-
tioned by the police in relays for about five hours. During this
time no friend or counsel was present. On these facts the Supreme
Court reversed the Ohio courts and held that the confession should
have been excluded as involuntary and as being violative of the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
There is no statute in Ohio which is specifically directed against
the third degree, but there is one which regulates detention after
arrest. 20 There is another the effect of which is to diminish police
questioning of suspects. 21 Furthermore, after a person has been
arrested in Ohio, any attorney is entitled, at the prisoner's request,
or at the request of any of his relatives, to visit him and consult
with him privately. Any violation of this request by an officer
renders him punishable by fine and imprisonment.22 In 1931, The
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement pub-
lished a report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement"2 in which it
examined in detail the existence of the third degree in the United
States. A study was made of fifteen cities, among them Cincinnati
and Cleveland. Compared with other cities throughout the country,
Cincinnati was given a clean bill of health as to the practice of
third degree methods. However, despite the statutory safeguards
thrown around arrested prisoners, they can always be circumvented
by the simple expedient of not reporting the arrest immediately
and shunting the prisoner from precinct to precinct. At the time
of the Commission's report, the third degree was prevalent in
Cleveland and was practiced constantly by the Cleveland police.24
It can be stated with finality that there are few cases of in-
18 Ohio v. Haley, 79 Ohio App. 237, 72 N.E. 2d 785 (1946) appeal denied
147 Ohio St. 340, 70 N.E. 2d 905 (1947).
19 Haley v. State, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1948).
2 OIo GEN. CODE §13432-3 (1939).
21 OHIo GEx. CODE §13432-22 1939).
-OHmo GEN. CODE §§13432-15, 13432-16 (1939); Thomas v. Wills, 117
Ohio St. 114, 157 N.E. 488 (1927).
23NATIONAL CommVssxoN ox LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFoncEwENT 116
(1931).
24Id. at 118.
517'1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
voluntary confessions and the use of the third degree to be found
in the reported cases in Ohio. In one such case the accused con-
tended that he had confessed after having been beaten on the way
to the police station and beaten and kicked during the grilling of
25 or 30 hours. The trial court refused to permit the defendant
to introduce evidence showing the violence used in eliciting the
confession. Because of this, the court of appeals reversed the con-
viction.25 Where the defendant confessed after a continued exami-
nation of 24 hours during which he was struck on the jaw several
times and during which his lawyer was barred from the "confes-
sion room" the conviction was affirmed because the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict without the confession.26
The most common of the third degree methods is excessive
questioning or "sweating" of the accused. Confessions so obtained
are invariably excluded. As expressed by the court in a leading
case, ". . . it appears that the officers transgressed the bounds of
propriety by constantly questioning the appellant and making
promises to him .... the court erred in admitting as evidence the
statements made by appellant to the officers, and the case should
be reversed for that reason. '27 No definite period can be said to
be excessive. Because of the physical makeup of individuals and
the variability of conditions and circumstances, the length of a per-
missive period must be determined from the facts of each case.
Objectionable questions can, however, be more readily discovered.
If the question contains a threat the confession thus obtained is
vitiated.28 Expressions such as "better tell the truth," and "it will
be best for you to tell the truth" have generally been held insuffi-
cient to render a confession inadmissible. 29 But such language,
coupled with other acts by the police officials, may render the ad-
mission, or confession, incompetent. Such statements may consti-
tute a veiled threat or be held out as an inducement. Whether the
25 Kosienski v. State, 24 Ohio App. 225, 157 N.E. 301 (1927).
2G Snook v. State, 34 Ohio App. 60, 170 N.E. 2d 444 (1929). See Mosley
v. State, 48 Ohio App. 554, 194 N.E. 2d 613 (1934).
27 Cobb v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 176, 179, 101 S.W. 2d 418, 419
(1936). For similar results see, People v. Goldblatt, 383 Ill. 176, 49 N.E.
2d 36 (1943) (where accused was subjected to three days of intensive
questioning); Enoch v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 411, 126 S.E. 222 (1925)
(defendant was interrogated for 14 hours and taken to house where victim
lay in coffin and was there questioned further); People v. Prestidge, 182
Mich. 80, 148 N.W. 347 (1914); Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 153 Ky.
412, 155 S.W. 1131 (1913); State v. Powell, 266 Mo. 100, 180 S.W. 851 (1915).
28Murphy v. United States, 285 Fed. 801, 811 (1923); People v. Pan-
tano 239 N.Y. 416, 146 N.E. 646 (1925).
29 Kelly v. State, 72 Ala. 244 (1882); State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221,
61 Pac. 805 (1900); Hintz v. Wisconsin, 125 Wis. 405, 104 N.W. 110 (1905);
State v. Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 428 (1923) where several examples of similar
phrases are discussed.
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statements were actually threats is not as important as "whether
the accused, at the time, thought they were.
A confession obtained by trick, if not calculated to prevent the
accused from telling the truth, will be received as evidence20 Al-
though a confession seems to be an unequivocal indication of guilt
to the average newspaper reader, it is in reality an unsatisfactory
and dangerous method of proof unless properly obtained. Aside
from the humanitarian considerations, it often leads to acquittals
on the grounds of fear and duress when legal evidence might have
been secured that would lead to convictions.
Cir LiAIrruy
Assuming that a person has been subjected to the brutality of
the third degree and has been injured or suffers mental anguish,
the perpetrators themselves are clearly liable, but can the injured
person recover from their superiors? The liability of an officer for
the wrong of a subordinate involves three aspects: the relation be-
tween the officer -and his subordinate; the officer's liability under
his bond; and public policy2' Ordinarily, an officer is not liable for
the negligence or misconduct of his subordinates on the theory of
respondeat superior, because it is said that the relationship of
master and servant does not exist between them.2 The denial of
the Application of respondeat superior seems invalid with respect
to third degree methods practiced in police stations. For there,
all of the requirements for the application of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior are met, since such officials have as much control
over subordinates at the police station as any employer has over his
employees. Frequently, these subordinate officers are appointed di-
rectly by the governmental unit and removable only at its pleasure;
but even where they are appointed and removed by their official
superior, the latter is not liable unless he himself has been negli-
gent in their selection or retention, or directed, authorized, or co-
operated in the wrong.
In a California case -the widow of a man who died as a result
of a beating administered by police officers of Oakland, sued the
chief of police, the city manager, and their bondsman for the wrong-
1o Commonwealth v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 122 Atl. 161 (1923); Johnson
v. State, 107 Miss. 196, 65 So. 218 (1914) (accused visited by a reporter who
said he was a spiritualist and that a confession would be good for accused's
soul).31 Comment, Liability of Public Officials for the Defaults of Their
Suberdinates, 13 ST. Join's L. REV. 351 (1930) (Where the author discusses
these same three aspects with reference to the liability of an officer en-
trusted with public funds for the defaults of subordinates).
OIMEcnamv oN AGENCY §1502 (2d ed. 1914). Where the author states
that the reasons are "motives of public policy, the necessities of the public
service, and the perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine."
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ful death of her husband. In overruling the defendant's demurrer,
the Supreme Court of California held that the power of a public
official to suspend or discharge his subordinates and to start pro-
ceedings to remove them carries with it the duty to exercise that
power vigilantly, and such official's negligent failure to act makes
him answerable in damages.23 Although the court expressly re-
jected the doctrine of respondeat superior in this case, the theory
used was the defendant's negligent failure to suspend or discharge
the officers. for unfitness and brutality known to defendants. It
would seem, therefore, that suit should be brought under one of
the exceptions to the doctrine of respondeat superior, i.e. that the
superior personally directed the third degree acts, or co-operated
in the offense, or failed to use ordinary care in employing or
discharging his subordinates.3 4 Where the general rule of nonlia-
bility for torts of subordinates has been enunciated, courts and text-
writers have taken great care not to imply immunization for offi-
cials who have, or should have had, knowledge of their subordi-
nates' vicious propensities.
In determining the liability of superior public officials in this
field, courts often confuse the issue by trying to ascertain whether
the duties of such officials are ministerial or discretionary. It has
been said that if the duty is absolute, imperative, and simply min-
isterial, the officer is liable in damages to anyone injured, either
by his omission to perform his duty, or by performing it negligently.
But if the official's power is discretionary, the official is not liable
for neglecting to use those powers.3 5 This distinction is not a valid
one because it is conducive to judicial acrobatics; a vehicle admir-
ably fitted to enable the court to reach the answer it feels is justi-
fied in the circumstances. Once the court has decided that the
duties are either ministerial or discretionary, the riddle of liability
or non-liability is solved. Where third degree tactics are practiced,
the superior officer may have authorized such conduct or, if not,
he is rarely free from negligence to some degree in retaining unfit
subordinates, or in not carefully overseeing their conduct. If that
premise be adopted, then we may forget the doctrine of respondeat
superior, ignore the unsound distinction between ministerial and
discretionary duties of the superior officer and permit recovery on
d showing that these subordinates are instrumentalities under the
control of the superior officers.
It is accepted in the law of torts that it is negligent to use an
33 Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P. 2d 12 (1943). See also,
Hale v. Johnson, 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S.W. 949 (1918).
4 Strickfaden v. Greencreek Hwy. Dist., 421 Idaho 738, 763, 248 P. 456,
463 (1926). 2 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE §330 (revised ed. 1941).35Hale v. Johnson, 140 Tenn. 182, 203 S.W. 949 (1918) (Official was
held liable for nonperformance of a ministerial duty).
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incompetent or unfit instrumentality, whether a human being or a
thing, which the user knows, or should know, to be so defective
that its use involves a chance of harm to others. 8 This theory of
recourse would not permit recovery where the superior officer him-
self was not at fault, and would impose no undue burden on public
officers. Even though the subordinate officers who administer the
third degree are themselves public officers, if their superior has the
power to suspend or remove them, then that places on him a cor-
relative duty to exercise that power to protect the public interest.
There can be no adequate protection of the public against the
brutality of the third degree unless the higher officials are answer-
able for their failure to discharge their duties.
It may be argued that even if a civil action were allowed
against a superior officer, such as a chief of police, that it would,
in most cases, afford an inadequate remedy so far as pecuniary
compensation is concerned. The answer to such an argument lies
in the amount of the bond which is required as condition precedent
to his qualification.37 The sureties on an official bond guarantee
faithful performance of official duty and it is taken to secure any
cause of action that may arise against an official for either mis-
feasance or nonfeasance. 8 The bond is required, and is given, for
the express purpose of protecting the public from illegal and un-
warranted acts of the officer in the discharge of his official duties0 9
Recovery directly from the bonding company has been allowed
where the police officer failed to faithfully perform his duties.40 Be-
yond the common-law duty which the law imposes to act carefully
once the duty to act is assumed, are duties created by statute. In
such cases, the extent of the liability incident to -a statutory duty
must be determined by the statute itself.4 If an officer's duty is to
an individual injured by a breach of that duty, the officer is per-
sonally liable. A breach of duty to the public may cause an action
0 RESTATEmENT, TORTS, §307 (1934).
37 Omo GEN. CoDE §§2399 (bond of county commissioners); 4219 (bond
for all officers in village government fixed by council with approval of the
mayor); 2824 (bond of sheriff); 1855 (bond for officers of state institu-
tions) (1939).
38 State v. Newman, 2 Ohio St. 567 (1853).
39 Rischer v. Meehan, 11 Ohio C.C. 403, 5 Ohio C.D. 416 (1896). For
an interesting discussion of the liability of a bondsman see Fernelius v.
Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P. 2d 12 (1943).40Maryland Casualty Co. v. McDiarmid, 116 Ohio St. 576, 157 N.E. 321
(1927); U.S. F. & G. Co. v. Samuels, 116 Ohio St. 587, 157 N.E. 325 (1927);
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Boehnlein, 202 Ky. 601, 260 S.W.
353 (1924).
41 POLLOcK, ToRTs 26 (13th ed. 1929). It may be that the Civil Rights
Act has been so broadly construed as to permit an aggrieved person to
utilize this federal statute in an action for damages in a state court. See
footnote 3.
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against the officer by the governmental unit representing the public.
It is not clear how the courts determine the nature of the duty, but
it seems to depend on certain policy factors. The argument is made
that if officers were held liable to individuals for every negligent
act committed by them, capable men would not accept public office.
This argument does not seem too strong since the officer has affirma-
tively accepted a position of public trust and responsibility. If an
individual is injured through the brutal third degree tactics of sub-
ordinates whom the superior officer knows to be, or should know
to be, inclined to commit such illegal acts of violence, then that
superior officer should be liable to the person injured as a conse-
quence of his failure to perform his duty as a conscientious public
official.
In Ohio, public officers are not liable for the acts, negligence, or
omissions of subordinate officials, whether appointed by them or
not, unless they direct the act complained of, or acquiesce in the
conduct from which the injury results. 2 Where they have em-
ployed persons of sufficient ability and have not been negligent in
their selection, they are free from liability. This indicates that if
a superior public officer retains in office a subordinate known to be
vicious, or who with reasonable diligence could be ascertained to be
of such a nature, recovery would be allowed in Ohio. However, in
one case in which the superintendent of a city workhouse was sued
for cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff while a prisoner,
the petition was dismissed as not stating a cause of action becausE
the superintendent owed his duty to the public and not to thE
individual.43
Where the superior officer is a sheriff, it seems that the doctrine
of respondeat superior will apply to render him liable for th
wrongful acts of his deputies. The Ohio statute provides, "Th
sheriff shall be responsible for neglect of duty or misconduct ir
office of each of his deputies." 41 This statute has been interpretec
to "place upon a sheriff the responsibility of seeing to it that hi:
choice of deputies be wisely made, and that trustworthy and de
pendable peace officers be chosen as his aides. It was well recog
nized that deputies might be over-officious, and might carelessly o:
wantonly disregard the rights and liberties of those whom the,
were selected to serve. It was therefore proper to repose responsi
bility in the appointing officer, to the end that his appointee woub
42 Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio 523 (1844). It should be noted tha
this was an action against a 'mail contractor' for the carelessness of hi
agents. It is assumed that the principle involved would carry over to a
action against an officer for the third degree methods employed by hi
subordinates.43 Rose v. Toledo, 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 321 (1903).
4-1 OHIO GEN. CODE §2831 (1939).
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not prostitute his office and that the people should be well served." 5
There does not seem to exist in Ohio sufficient means whereby a
person injured by subordinate officers by the use of third degree
methods may bring a civil action against the superior officer and
recover damages. 46 The doctrine of respondeat superior is not ap-
plicable, and public officers are usually not liable for the acts of
their subordinates in public service, unless, as courts and text writ-
ers have pointed out, the superior officer negligently, or wilfully,
employs or retains, unfit or improper persons, or refrains from sus-
pending them if he has not the power to discharge them.
In considering the civil remedy for abusive treatment at the
hands of public officials, it must be kept in mind that a municipality
is not liable for torts committed by police officers in making arrests,
or for assaults upon prisoners in their custody.'-
The maintenance of a police department by a municipality is
done in the exercise of its governmental function and the munici-
pality is not, in the absence of statutory provision, liable in damages
for the negligent or tortious acts of the members of its police de-
partment.48 In Ohio, no statutory remedy against a municipality
is provided.
CRIMINAL LIABITY FOR ABUSIVE TREATMENT
At common law a police officer indulging in third degree prac-
tices was criminally liable.4 9 In a number of states express legis-
lation has imposed criminal liability for the acts of an officer in
coercing a prisoner to confess.5 The legislature of Ohio has seen
fit to enact at least two criminal statutes which could be invoked.51
Although they provide a penalty for an officer who injures or op-
presses one by color of his office, the sanction invoked is pitifully
inadequate. However, even if the penalty were more severe the
difficulty would not be lessened, because of the tendency of fellow
officers to give perjured testimony in order to clear a member of
the force. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney who by acquiescence,
45 Hanratty v. Godfrey, 44 Ohio App. 360, 184 N.E. 842 (1932); See also
1939 Ops. ATr'Y. GEN. (Ohio) No. 1289.
4 1 Rose v. Toledo, 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 321 (1903).
47 Abvord, Adm'r v. Village of Richmond, 3 Ohio N.P. 136, 4 Ohio Dec.
(N.P.) 177 (1896); Rose v. Toledo, 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 321 (1903); see
Hunter and Boyer, Tort Liability of Local Goverhments in Ohio, 9 OHIO ST.
L. J. 377 (1948).
48 Similarly where a Board of County Commissioners is sued for in-
juries received by a prisoner while in a county jail, the county is not liable.
Besser v. Board of County Commissioners, 58 Ohio App. 499, 16 N.E. 2d 947
(1938).
49 33 M cH. L. REV. 451 (1934).
50 These statutes are collected in 2 NATIO IAL CommiSsIoN ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 213 (1931).
51 OHio GEN. CODE §§ 12915 and 12925 (1939).
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if not approbation, encourages officers to procure confessions is not
likely to be over-zealous in prosecuting official lawlessness which
lightens the burden of his office. The deterring influence of criminal
liability is not a very forceful one.
Perhaps a more direct action against offenders could be taken
by an action to oust such offenders from public office by means of
a quo warranto proceeding.
52
This recourse possesses a distinct advantage in that it provides
an immediate penalty-the loss of the wrongdoer's job, the threat
of which is quite likely to have a certain deterrent effect. In Ohio
such an action may be brought in the name of the state against a
public officer who "does or suffers an act which, by the provisions
of law, works a forfeiture of his office. 5 3 Where the cause of re-
moval from office is given by a statute which also provides a special
procedure for the removal, then the statutory remedy is exclusive
and an action of quo warranto will not lie .
4
Neither statutes nor regulations can stifle the third degree.
The community must insist on high standards in police and other
officials. If this is done, this infamous treatment will cease to be
condoned and can be wiped out. A vocal press can help the cause
by publicity of violations. The third degree degrades the very
people who practice it, hardens and embitters the prisoner against
society and gives him a fear and contempt of law enforcing agen-
cies; and it lowers the esteem in which justice and its administra-
tion is held by the public. The people must demand and expect to
provide adequate compensation for intelligent law enforcement
officers highly skilled in techniques of scientific crime detection.
Strong arm methods of extracting admissions are a poor substitute
utilized by lethargic police officials who are not trained in the
modern art of compiling evidence. Proper training is an important
responsibility of the police profession and should be conducted at
a true professional level. To adequately cope with our complex
society, the police service and the taxpayer must take advantage
of the strides made in scientific crime detection.
Don W. Sears.
5z State ex rel. Boynton v. Jackson, 139 Kan. 744, 22 P. 2d 118 (1934).
53 OHio GEx. CODE §12303 (1939).
54 State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. McLain, 58 Ohio St. 313, 50 N.E. 90
(1898).
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